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This article is reprinted from the Introduction to David Kershaw’s The Foundations of Anglo-American 
Corporate Fiduciary Law which will be published by Cambridge University Press in August 2018. 
The book explores the doctrinal pre-history of US and UK corporate fiduciary law – the duties 
the law imposes on directors, and shows how understanding these pre-histories drives a re-
evaluation of the nature, quality and production processes of contemporary corporate law in 
both jurisdictions. The book provides a legal etymology of US and UK corporate fiduciary law 
– an account of the origins of the concepts and ideas that provide the raw materials of modern 
corporate fiduciary law, such as rationality review and fairness review, gross negligence and skills 
adjusted ordinary care – and a historical legal genealogy or topography – the excavation of a map 
of the path of these ideas from their origins through to today. In excavating these historical legal 
maps, the book seeks to explain why these US and UK legal paths were taken and why alternative 
available paths were not seen, or were foreclosed. It is the juxtaposition of the UK and US pre-
histories which enables this exploration because although today the fiduciary duties which 
corporate law imposes on the directors of US and UK companies are starkly different, both 
jurisdictions started from the same place by borrowing from the same eighteenth and nineteenth 
century English, non-corporate legal sources. This juxtaposition, the book argues, enables us to 
see the real drivers of US and UK corporate legal evolution and divergence and to challenge 
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u
Introduction: Corporate Legal Ideas
A Corporate Law’s Pre-History
Corporate law is theoretically rich but historically poor. There is a
“pre-history”1 of corporate law that is prior to the discipline’s histor-
ical knowledge, horizon and imagination; a pre-history of legal con-
cepts and doctrinal structures upon which contemporary corporate
law is built, but which is either unknown to the discipline or repre-
sented by only a small number of historical standard bearers. If, as
Holmes counselled, “in order to know what [the law] is, we must know
what it has been”,2 then our understanding of corporate law today is
deﬁcient as the discipline possesses only fragments of knowledge about
its pre-history.
The discipline does not, however, accept Holmes’s proposition; it has
evidenced no desire to uncover this pre-history. Modern corporate
law’s functionalism renders such an inquiry surplus to requirements:
corporate law provides functional solutions to the governance and
agency problems generated by the corporate form; necessarily, the
origins of these rules lie in legal innovations and adaptations designed
to address those functional problems. It follows that tracing the doc-
trinal origins of these legal rules may be of interest, but at best it can
only add a little colour to what is self-evident about law’s adaption to
these functional imperatives. Academic energy is better spent
elsewhere.
This book is animated by Holmes’s proposition and sidesteps the
above disciplinary advice. It explores the pre-histories of US and UK
1 See David Ibbetson,AHistorical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University
Press: 1999) at 1 using the term “pre-history” in relation to the law of obligations;
John Armour, “Review of ‘An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate
Law’” (2002)Cambridge Law Journal 467, identifying a “pre-history” “gap” in his review of
Michael Whincop’s book.
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Little, Brown & Co.: 1881) 1.
1
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corporate ﬁduciary law3 – the duties the law imposes on directors, and
shows how understanding those duties in historical perspective drives
a re-evaluation of the nature, quality and production processes of con-
temporary corporate law in both jurisdictions. The book presents these
pre-histories through a close doctrinal study; a study designed to identify
the original moral and policy drivers of corporate ﬁduciary law’s founda-
tional ideas and concepts, and to carefully trace the inﬂuence and path of
those ideas and concepts through the adaptations and adjustments of the
eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century case law. The ﬁrst objec-
tive of the book then is to provide both a legal etymology of corporate
ﬁduciary law – an account of the origins of the concepts and ideas that
provide the raw materials of modern corporate ﬁduciary law, such as
rationality review and fairness review, gross negligence and skills-
adjusted ordinary care – and a historical legal genealogy or topography –
the excavation of a map of the path of these ideas from their origins
through to today. This exploration is organised in the book into four
separate parts. Part I explores the duties that apply to a director’s exercise
of corporate power, her business judgment; Part II considers the direc-
torial duty of care; Part III explores the law applicable to directorial self-
dealing; and Part IV considers the law applicable to corporate opportu-
nities, which the book calls “connected assets law”.
In excavating these historical legal maps, the book’s second objective is
to explain why these US and UK legal paths were taken and why alter-
native available paths were not seen, or were foreclosed. It is the juxta-
position of the UK and US pre-histories which enables this exploration.
This juxtaposition provides a natural legal experiment through which we
can control for the real drivers of the paths taken and of jurisdictional
divergence. This is because although today the ﬁduciary duties which
corporate law imposes on the directors of US4 and UK companies are
very different, both jurisdictions started from the same place. In both
jurisdictions, in order to fashion directors’ duties, nineteenth-century
courts borrowed from the same eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
English, non-corporate legal sources. And in several instances, for
3 Note that, for simplicity’s sake, the book adopts the US use of the term “ﬁduciary duties” to
include the directorial duty of care, which in the United Kingdom is not understood to be
a ﬁduciary duty.
4 Although there is no such entity as a US corporation – there are only corporations
incorporated in US states – we will use the terms “US company” and “US corporate law”
as useful ways of referring to corporate law in the United States and corporations
incorporated in a US state.
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a period in the mid-nineteenth century, the leading cases in the United
States and the United Kingdom were English eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century corporate cases, fashioned from English non-corporate
legal borrowings.
This shared heritage is both difﬁcult to believe, and to see, when one
considers the leading corporate law jurisdiction in the United States, the
state of Delaware, and contrasts its modern corporate ﬁduciary laws with
the law applied today in the United Kingdom. Consider ﬁrst Delaware
law’s regulation of business judgments. Today, Delaware law is well
known for its business judgment rule, which provides that if the directors
comply with both their duty of care in the process of making a decision
and their duty of loyalty – which requires that they act in good faith and
that there be no direct conﬂict – then the decision will only be subject to
rationality review. That is, if there is a rational reason to support the
decision, courts will not inquire further. In the United Kingdom,
a director’s business judgment is subject to the requirement to act in
good faith to promote the success of the company in the interests of its
shareholders, which generates both rationality review of decisions and, in
some instances, more demanding and intrusive review. In the UK,
neither care nor loyalty is understood as a precondition to a separate
business review standard. If we turn to those duties of care and loyalty,
the differences appear starker. The decision-making process is subject to
a gross negligence standard in Delaware, breach of which is in some cases
said to require proof of reckless indifference or deliberate disregard to the
interests of shareholders. Care in relation to monitoring requires merely
a good faith effort to monitor and a good faith effort to put in place
systems and controls to enable monitoring. The UK, in contrast, applies
a version of an average-director reasonableness standard to both process
and monitoring, and the nomenclature of gross negligence has long been
rejected. In relation to direct conﬂicts of interest, Delaware law today
applies fairness review to self-dealing transactions, whereas the UK
common law provides for the voidability of self-dealing transactions in
the absence of shareholder approval, and eschews any inquiry into
transactional fairness. Delaware’s corporate opportunity rule is ﬂexible
and pro-director and pays regard, inter alia, to whether the company has
a property-like “expectancy” in the opportunity, to the company’s area of
business, and to the company’s ﬁnancial capacity to acquire the oppor-
tunity. Whereas the modern UK anti-director position has no regard to
corporate expectancies, rejects line-of-business restrictions and excludes
evidence of ﬁnancial capacity. Attention to the detail of some of these
corporate law ’s pre-history 3
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rules smoothes some of their ﬁrst-blush hard edges, bringing similarity as
well as difference into view. Nevertheless, in several areas of corporate
ﬁduciary law these ﬁrst impressions do not deceive.
These considerable differences intuitively lead us to view these
modern legal rules as being connected to a shared legal history in
only the most perfunctory and superﬁcial way – in the way that one
might say that American and British cultures are connected as they are
formed through the syntax and structures of a shared language. This is
not correct. Modern US corporate ﬁduciary law is deeply rooted in
legal principles ﬁrst formed in, and borrowed from, the United
Kingdom. In Part I, we see that in both jurisdictions contemporary
regulation of business judgment is the product of an eighteenth- and
early nineteenth-century common law approach to the exercise of
delegated power in both public and private law contexts. In Part II,
we see that the modern care standard in both the US and the United
Kingdom is the product of eighteenth-century English legal ideas
about the care that could be expected of those paid or unpaid to
undertake a bailment of goods; bailment law ideas that diverged in
the United States and the United Kingdom prior to corporate legal
adoption. In Part III, we see that the UK’s self-dealing rule is based on
trust law’s prohibition of trustee-trust self-dealing, and that the US’s
fairness standard is a product both of the exploration of the remedial
implications of that same standard, as well as broader borrowing from
the English ﬁduciary law’s regulation of ﬁduciary-beneﬁciary inﬂu-
ence. In Part IV, we see that today’s corporate opportunities rules in
the United States are the partial product of eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century case law on whether a trustee could take a lease,
or buy the reversion, in property subject to a lease held on trust; legal
rules which, although the product of early English ﬁduciary law,
struggled to gain traction in UK company law.
B A History of Legal Ideas
The book charts these pre-histories with the assistance of four guiding
legal ideas. These ideas are distilled from the exploration of each of the
areas of ﬁduciary law covered in Parts I–IV of the book. The book’s
submission is that each of these legal ideas is pivotal to understanding
why corporate law in the US and the UK has taken the paths the book
describes. These ideas are the nuclei of corporate ﬁduciary law’s forma-
tion and divergence. Of course, in the complex process of legal formation
and change the book describes, it is very difﬁcult, perhaps foolhardy, to
4 corporate legal ideas
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attribute primary status to one particular idea. The point in elevating
these ideas is not to ﬂatten the complex processes of legal development
the book describes; nor is the point to argue that corporate ﬁduciary rules
are the deductive product of these ideas. The point is simply to fore-
ground ideas that have been foundational to corporate ﬁduciary law’s
development and divergence.
In Part I the guiding idea is “the idea of honesty in the exercise of
delegated authority”. Modern business judgment regulation in both the
US and the UK is a direct product of a basic moral idea, recognised in early
eighteenth-century ﬁduciary law, that you cannot expect more of
a delegatee than that she exercise the delegated authority in what she
honestly thinks furthers the purpose of the delegation; an idea that is the
direct ancestor of the business judgment rule and rationality review.
In Part II we see that the care standards that ﬂow into modern corporate
law were the product of moral ideas adopted by the common law about the
relationship between care and reward, and care and undertaking. How
much care, for example, could one expect from a “friendly act for his
friend”?5 More precisely, the book shows that early care concepts and
standards were the product of a tension between, on the one hand, the care
one could expect from bailees who were rewarded or unrewarded for their
bailment service, and, on the other hand, the care one could expect from
someone who gave an undertaking to act on another person’s behalf.
In Part II, we see how the differential weighting of these two different
moral ideas in the US and the UK accounts in signiﬁcant part for the
different corporate care standards we ﬁnd today. In Part III, we look not to
a moral idea to explain the divergence of US and UK self-dealing law, but
to the “idea of the corporation”. Here we see that starkly different ideas
about the nature of the corporation in the United Kingdom and the United
States generated starkly divergent paths of self-dealing law, both of which,
however, are rooted in, and consistent with, nineteenth-century non-
corporate English ﬁduciary law. Finally, in Part IV the book shows that
the paths of US andUK corporate opportunities law, which the book labels
connected assets law, are in large part the product of divergent nineteenth-
century ideas about both themeaning of the term “property” and about the
creation of property rights. More speciﬁcally, the dominance in the United
States (and its absence in the UK) within and outside of the law of
a Lockean justiﬁcation for property rights: that property is not merely
a label for a bundle of exclusionary rights which are otherwise grounded –
5 Coggs v. Barnard (1703) LD Raym. 909, 194.
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for example to prevent fraud or in relations of conﬁdence – but rather
property is created by labour, work and effort; is prior to and recognised by
law; property as right. It was this guiding idea in the United States that
fertilised a nascent legal rule about connected assets borrowed from early
nineteenth-century English ﬁduciary law to generate the modern corpo-
rate opportunities doctrine; a rule that although originated in the UK
withered in the UKwithout the fertilisation provided by this property idea.
C Divergence and Theories of Corporate Legal Change
in the United States
The spirit of Oliver Wendell Holmes will never tire of reminding us that
the life of law is not logic but experience.6 To account for legal divergence
in jurisdictions which had shared common law starting points, we natu-
rally look to experiential/extra-legal explanations, such as variation in the
extra-legal interest group landscape; jurisdictional differences in consen-
sus policy preferences; or jurisdictional variation in judicial receptivity to
such pressure and policies. Indeed, the divergence of modern US and UK
corporate law correlates extremely well with mainstream “experiential”
corporate legal theories and approaches to US legal history, which are
outlined below. For example, a theory about how American corporate
legal federalism results in pro-managerial rules in areas of the law such as
self-dealing law or connected assets law ﬁts perfectly with both the
modern pro-director ﬁduciary rules we ﬁnd in the United States and
the pro-shareholder rules in the United Kingdom, which are not subject
to the pressures arising from state competition for incorporations.
The problem with this and other such extra-legal theories of corporate
law change is that they have not been disciplined by the control of
doctrinal corporate legal history. Without a comprehensive understand-
ing of the historical trajectory of modern corporate ﬁduciary law, we do
not know whether substantive legal change has occurred at all – or in
which of the divergent jurisdictions it has occurred – which requires or
could beneﬁt from an extra-legal change explanation. Nor, in the absence
of an understanding of this historical trajectory can we understand how
such extra-lawmaking pressures interacted with prior legal norms to
produce an output that is an amalgam of both. Offering a theory of
legal production and change without an understanding of the law’s
6 Supra note 2, at 1.
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historical precursors is like trying to write a recipe after the cake has been
baked, when you are aware of the existence of ﬂour but have never heard
of eggs; inevitably in the recipe ﬂour will take precedence over the
unknown ingredient. And inevitably, unaware of its pre-history, corpo-
rate law’s theories of rule production and change overweight the role of
extra-legal factors and underweight law’s internal constraint, including
the legal path dependence imposed by the common law’s earliest elec-
tions. The corporate doctrinal history provided by this book both dis-
ciplines contemporary corporate law’s extra-legal claims and provides
clearer sight of the extra-legal factors that have and have not moulded the
path of corporate ﬁduciary law.
This doctrinal genealogy also foregrounds a complementary, but more
prosaic, account of legal change; an account that is self-evident to those
schooled in the common law method, but one which is often pushed
from the limelight by experiential theories. Here we see the path of the
common law as the product of judicial mis-readings, re-presentations
and mis-representations; slight entropic adjustments in legal positions
that disturb the prior order of legal things; the common law equivalent of
the butterﬂy effect.7 Courts unschooled in, or hostile to paying attention
to, the existing legal tradition redirect the path of law with small adjust-
ments – often unintentionally and unnoticed both by reader and author –
in the statement of the legal position; small adjustments that, sometimes
with a time delay, generate signiﬁcant legal change. Although this prosaic
account of change is exposed to the charge of the modern legal leprosy of
legal formalism, we need to be cognisant of this effect, alongside other
possible drivers of legal change, in order to understand the twists and
turns in the path of law, and to assess its legitimacy and authority. This is
law by “telephone” or “Chinese Whispers”; contingent, quasi-random
legal products that once identiﬁed should garner little systemic loyalty.
We see several examples of this effect in both US and UK corporate
ﬁduciary law, although it is more pronounced in the Delaware courts,
where, as we discuss below, the effect of being a winner in the race for
incorporations accentuates the disconnection from legal tradition, pro-
viding freer rein to re-present. For example, in Part I of the book we show
how the re- and mis-representation of the business judgment rule in the
famous case of Aronson v. Lewis8 in 1984 generates several new and
incoherent legal logics; and in the United Kingdom we show how
7 James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (Viking Press: 1987).
8 473 A.2d 805 (1984).
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modern confusion about the relationship between the duty of care and
the quality of the business judgment is rooted in the use of reasonableness
terms in non-care standards designed to articulate the idea that the courts
have no jurisdiction to interfere with a business judgment in the absence
of extreme error. In Part IV we see how the slight shift in the United
Kingdom’s no conﬂict rule resulting from the leading connected assets
case of Boardman v. Phipps9 – from a conﬂict of interest and duty to
a conﬂict of interests – drives substantive change in UK connected assets
law as well as the new idea of prescriptive directorial duties.
1 Realist Legal History and the Search for Experience
A dominant idea about judging in nineteenth-century American law is
that US judges operated with very limited regard to precedential con-
straint, and that judicial practices and institutional arrangements sup-
ported this approach to judging. For proponents of this idea of American
legal history, judges were “all realists then”.10 Through this lens, judges
did not commence the judicial operation from within the rules and
principles found within prior cases, building out to the facts presented
to them in court, rather they “beg[a]n with a vague anticipation of
a conclusion and . . . and then . . . look[ed] around for principles and
data that w[ould] substantiate it”.11
For this account of legal change, US law in the nineteenth century was
not a closed, or even relatively autonomous,12 system that imposed
constraint on judicial discretion and outcomes; rather law was an open
system, and the laws were readily remade by judges in the image of
prevailing social norms, economic needs, policy concerns, interest
group pressure and ideological preferences. Of course, the common law
has always been “in part an exercise in interpreting the needs and feelings
of the wider community”,13 but in the strongest version of this
9 [1967] 2 A.C. 46.
10 Paraphrasing Joseph Singer who in 1988 argued that “to a great extent we are all realists
now” – Joseph Singer, “Legal Realism Now” (1988) 76 California Law Review 468, 503.
11 John Dewey, “Logical Method and Law” (1924) 10 Cornell Law Quarterly 560, 567.
12 Duncan Kennedy, “Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940” (1980) 3 Research in Law
and Sociology 3, 4, referring to “legal consciousness as an entity with a measure of
autonomy . . . yet that autonomy is no more than relative”.
13 Michael Lobban, “The Politics of English Law in the 19th Century” in Joshua Getzler and
Paul Brand (eds) Judges and Judging in the History of the Common Law and Civil Law
(Cambridge University Press: 2012) 102, 111.
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understanding of nineteenth-century American legal practice, the logic
of the law was merely a deposable façade for judicial legislation fashioned
by experience.
Several nineteenth-century institutional factors support this idea of
US judicial practice – factors that were not present in other common law
countries such as the United Kingdom, where such instrumentalist
accounts of legal history have struggled to gain a foothold.14
Of importance in this regard was the fact that many US judges were lay
judges with no legal training.15 Furthermore, by the 1840s and 1850s
many judges began to be directly elected, and such judgesmay, as a result,
have had a much stronger sense of the political legitimacy of their
democratic role to “reﬂect the values of the people”.16 Such an outlook
would also have been supported in late eighteenth- and earlier nine-
teenth-century decisions by the lack of available law reports,17 as well as
by the fact that the abolition of separate courts of equity and common law
in many US jurisdictions meant that judges were less likely to have
specialised legal knowledge, particularly in relation to equity.18 James
Kent, on taking the position of chancellor in New York’s Chancery
Court, famously observed that: “I took the court as if it had been a new
institution. I had nothing to guide me . . . [and] almost always found
principles suited to my views of the case”.19
A signiﬁcant body of academic and judicial authority can be mar-
shalled in support of this account of American legal history. These
accounts vary according to (1) the extent to which they understand law
as an open system; (2) their selection of their dominant experiential
14 See Michael Lobban, “The Politics of English Law in the Nineteenth Century” in
Joshua Getzler and Paul Brand (eds) Judges and Judging in the History of the Common
Law and the Civil Law: From Antiquity to Modern Times (Cambridge University Press:
2012) at 106–112; Michael Lobban, “Legal Theory and Judge Made Law in England”
(2011) 40 Quaderni Fiorentini 554.
15 Peter Karsten, Heart versus Head: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth Century America
(University of North Carolina Press: 1997) (location 644 Kindle Edition).
16 Ibid. (location 6787 Kindle edition) citing Robert Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and
the Judicial Process (Yale University Press: 1975) 178. See also Lawrence M. Friedman,
A History of American Law (2nd edn, Simon & Schuster: 1985), 371–391.
17 See supra note 15 at location 644.
18 Note that in some jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, there was never a separation of law
and equity. In others, like New York, separate courts began to be abolished by the mid-
nineteenth century. See Kellen Funk, “Equity without Chancery: The Fusion of Law and
Equity in the Field Code of Civil Procedure, New York 1846–76” (2015) 36 The Journal of
Legal History 152, and Joseph H. Beale, “Equity in America” (1921–1923) 1 Cambridge
Law Journal 21, 25.
19 Supra note 15 at location 758.
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driver; and (3) the extent to which they view nineteenth-century laws as
having been remade in this image of these concerns; that is, the extent of
legal continuity and the extent of legal change. The most inﬂuential
realist school of legal history is the Wisconsin tradition of legal history
associated with the great American legal historians James Willard
Hurst20 and Lawrence Friedman.21 TheWisconsin tradition offers a self-
consciously instrumentalist approach to legal history that views law “as
not totally (or even mostly) autonomous”22 and, “in American society at
least”, as “a tool, an implement, which concrete interest groups and
individuals manipulated for whatever ends they had in mind”.23 For
this school of thought “law moves with its times and is eternally
new”.24 The Wisconsin tradition focuses, in particular, on the ways in
which common law rules were adjusted to respond to the instrumental
needs of commerce and the marketplace. Peter Karsten, summarising the
views of this tradition, observed:
According to the author of the leading textbook on American legal history
the better antebellum jurists, such as Lemuel Shaw, the Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court of Judicature (1830–60) and John
Bannister Gibson (1827–53), “could write for pages without citing
a shred of authority”. Moreover, “they did not choose to base their
decisions on precedent alone; law had to be chiselled out of basic princi-
ple”. Far from being checked by hide-bound English precedents, jurists of
the Golden Age of American Lawwere willing and able to create new rules
from time to time consistent with needs of a new and burgeoning
America.25
For Friedman, the author of the leading textbook to whom Karsten refers
in the above quotation, nineteenth-century US judges decided cases on
an “expedient economic basis”. Concluding his analysis of the Law of
Sales, for example, Friedman observes that it is
another example of the principle that nothing – neither small specks of
technicality nor large stains of legal logic and jargon – was allowed to
interfere in the nineteenth century with what judges or the dominant
20 For example, James W. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth
Century United States (University of Wisconsin Press: 1956).
21 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (2nd edn, Simon & Schuster: 1985).
22 Lawrence M. Friedman, “Losing One’s Head: Judges and the Law in 19th Century
American Legal History” (1999) 24 Law and Social Inquiry 253, 277 (emphasis in
original).
23 Laurence M. Friedman, “Opening the Time Capsule: A Progress Report on Studies of
Courts Over Time” (1990) 24 Law and Society Review 229, 230.
24 Friedman, supra note 21 at 18. 25 Supra note 15 at location 640.
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public saw as the highroad to progress and wealth. . . . The pressure to buy
or sell on credit were strong; the resistance of law makers was absent, or
transient or weak.26
Other schools of American legal history are even more assertive in
viewing nineteenth-century judges as being highly responsive to instru-
mental considerations, and also in viewing the primary driver of legal
change to be the needs of capital and the marketplace. For example,
MortonHorwitz, one of the leading critical legal historians, argues that in
the nineteenth century law came to be viewed by the judiciary as an
“instrument of policy”:27
By 1820 the process of common law decision making had taken on many
of the qualities of legislation. As judges began to conceive of common law
adjudication as a process of making and not merely discovering legal
rules, they were led to frame general doctrines based on self-conscious
consideration of social and economic policies. . . . [From this period]
judges began to use law in order to encourage social change even in
areas where they had previously refrained from doing so.28
These instrumental economic accounts of legal history are not without
their detractors. Peter Karsten’s monumental revisionist account argues
that the Wisconsin and Critical Legal Studies versions of legal history
profoundly overstate the extent of nineteenth-century legal change.29 He
ﬁnds continuity where Horwitz and Friedman ﬁnd instrumental legal
change. And where he does ﬁnd the imprint of policy concerns that result
in legal change, they are not economic ones. These courts, according to
Karsten, were concerned with the interests of poor litigants and they were
anti-entrepreneur and anti-corporate. These limited changes arose, for
Karsten, from a jurisprudence “of the heart”.30
The validity of the above positions in the non-corporate areas of law
which they cover is of no concern to us here. The Wisconsin and Critical
Legal Studies traditions concern us because they offer a powerful theory
of legal change, which may make sense of the divergence in UK and
US corporate ﬁduciary law. If the US judicial outlook that Friedman and
26 Supra note 21. at 543.
27 Morton J Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780–1860 (Harvard University
Press: 1977), 30. Note that Horwitz posits an antebellum period of instrumental adjust-
ment of law and a post-bellum formalist understanding of the law that fossilised legal
rules that now reﬂected the interests of capital.
28 Ibid. 2, 4. 29 Supra note 15
30 For a trenchant rejection of Karsten’s work, see Friedman, Losing One’s Head, supra
note 22.
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Horwitz describe is correct, then the path of US corporate ﬁduciary law,
and its divergence from the UK position, may be the product of
US judicial receptivity to the interests and economic needs of corpora-
tions and commerce and, particularly, to the interests of the individuals
who managed and controlled those corporations.
Karsten’s work is also important to the book’s inquiry because in
testing this theory he encourages us to be circumspect in attributing
legal change to such extra-legal drivers, and to dig as deep as possible
to determine whether apparent legal change can be made sense of
through the lens of legal continuity. He teaches us that mainstream
instrumental theories of legal change are sometimes too easy; that they
can have a narcoleptic effect on our critical faculties. It is, for example,
trite scholarship that corporate ﬁduciary law must provide functional
solutions to corporate governance problems, and that laws that fail to do
so may generate obstacles and costs for corporations, undermine value
generation, and make the corporate form a less attractive vehicle for
business organisation. And it is self-evident that such laws are likely to
come under pressure from the marketplace to change. But, as Karsten’s
work reminds us, that does not mean that where the laws that we see
today correlate with our assessment of the policy objectives of corporate
law, or with the perceived needs of the marketplace, that those laws are
the direct product of law’s capitulation to those policies and needs, even if
the Wisconsin and Critical Legal traditions of legal history accurately
describe judicial receptivity to them. In many instances, a pre-existing
legal approach was well adapted to the needs of the marketplace, and no
change was necessary at all. In others, law explored internal, immanently
available solutions to those pressures, revealing only apparent continuity
and not the invisible imprint of those pressures. In others, the idea that
the law’s path merely instrumentally reﬂects the needs of, and the pres-
sures from, immediate constituents is an impoverished understanding of
legal realism and an impoverished understanding of how law interacts
with the social world and the big ideals that structure that world.
In relation to the ﬁrst of the above caveats – that borrowed legal goods
were often already suitable to fulﬁl the market’s functional needs –
consider, for example, the scope for judicial oversight of business judg-
ments covered in Part I of the book. It is commonplace in US case law and
commentary to explain the modern business judgment rule through the
lens of policy concerns about encouraging board service and ensuring
that directors are not too risk averse when they exercise corporate power.
There is a strong modern sense that these rules are the product of courts
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adapting corporate law rules in the image of these policy concerns.
In fact, we ﬁnd in Part I that the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
law regulating the exercise of delegated discretion provided an apposite
and deferential solution for the oversight of corporate decision making;
a solution which was borrowed wholesale by corporate law as it was
already ﬁt for corporate purpose. This borrowed legal technique was the
product of moral ideas and of policy considerations, some of which are
closely related to some of the modern policy ideas referred to above.
Accordingly, in this area of the law we ﬁnd signiﬁcant legal continuity
from the beginning of the eighteenth through to the beginning of the
twenty-ﬁrst century. To the extent we ﬁnd divergence, Part I demon-
strates that it is a modern – late twentieth-century – phenomenon
primarily attributable in both jurisdictions to the slight entropic re-
presentations of the law referred to above; but also, inferentially, to the
openness of UK courts, and the comparative closure of Delaware courts,
to contemporary extra-legal concerns about ensuring board accountabil-
ity. In this latter regard, the book argues that the increasing public
concern in the UK with board accountability from the late 1960s
onwards, connected to multiple high-proﬁle corporate scandals, left its
imprint on late twentieth-century common law.
In relation to the idea that external extra-legal pressures do not change
the law but drive a deeper exploration of the immanent possibilities
contained within it, in Part III we show that the nineteenth-century
ﬁduciary self-dealing rules when applied to the corporation – which
prohibited self-dealing without shareholder approval – created difﬁcul-
ties for corporations where self-dealing was necessary or beneﬁcial. These
commercial problems resulted in a contractual solution in the United
Kingdom, involving altering the approval mechanism for self-dealing
contracts through an amendment to the corporate constitution. In the
United States, where such a contractual solution was unavailable, we see
how an awareness of the commercial use of self-dealing transactions
encouraged judges to explore the range of legal solutions contained
within existing ﬁduciary law, creating two different, internally consistent
paths to the modern-day fairness standard.
The exploration of corporate law’s pre-history in this book does not
ﬁnd examples of ways in which corporate law was instrumentally refash-
ioned at the altar of commercial need and economic expediency in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There is no evidence that corporate
ﬁduciary laws are the direct product of the legal changes and adaptations
designed to satisfy the needs of the marketplace or of the interests of
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powerful constituents; no evidence that corporate law was an “instru-
ment of policy”. However, we do ﬁnd the noticeable imprint of distinctive
social ideas about life in nineteenth-century America – imprints that
interact with and foster existing legal principles; generating corporate
legal outcomes that appear, through an ex-post governance lens, to be
functionally effective. The book describes these social ideas as compo-
nents of the nineteenth-century “Idea of America”; it is here we see that
US corporate ﬁduciary law afﬁrms Holmes’ claim that “the law embodies
the story of a nation’s development through the centuries”.31 Consider,
for example, divergence in bailment law in the United States (from its UK
counterpart), which, as we will see in Part II, is the primary source of
borrowing for the US’s directorial duty of care. Here an idea about the
transactional, commodiﬁed nature of nineteenth-century American life
generated a valence towards the care implications of reward, or the
absence thereof; a valence that elevated the importance of certain ver-
sions of the gross negligence standard; a standard that then ﬂowed into
corporate law. In the context of opportunities in Part IV, we ﬁnd the
inﬂuence of two such ideas: an anti-monopoly sentiment underpinning
American society, particularly in the unexplored and unclaimed parts of
the New World; as well as, more importantly, the idea referred to in
Section B above which is leitmotif of Part IV, namely a moral and social
idea, which becomes a legal idea, about the meaning and creation of
property in nineteenth-century American life. Importantly, these ideas
about America did not change and break existing laws but elevated
certain legal principles already present in the English common law;
whereas in the United Kingdom in the absence of those external ideas,
these principles were downgraded or became dormant.
2 Corporate Legal Federalism
For half a century, US corporate legal scholarship has been ﬁxated on
both the idea that corporate legal federalism – which has resulted in
Delaware being the jurisdiction of choice for 66 per cent of Fortune 500
companies32 – has substantive legal effects, and on explaining Delaware’s
success. The debate is so well trodden, both within the United States and
internationally, that it requires only the briefest of introductions here.
31 Supra note 2 at 1.
32 Delaware Division of Corporations 2015 Annual Report, 1. The Annual Report also notes
that “86% of U.S. based Initial Public Offerings in 2015 chose Delaware as their corporate
home”.
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The modern debate is typically traced to former SEC chairman William
Cary who, in presenting a case for federal government intervention
(not federal incorporation), presented Delaware as a “pygmy among
the 50 states”33 and as a “sponsor and a victim of a system contributing
to the deterioration of corporation standards”.34 For Cary, corporate
legal federalism led to a “race to the bottom”, with Delaware creating
rules that beneﬁted managers in order to attract them to incorporate in
Delaware and to bring with them the franchise taxes upon which
Delaware is heavily reliant. An incentive structure which, Cary argued,
affected not only the legislative process, but also the Delaware courts and
ﬁduciary standards:
Judicial decisions in Delaware illustrate that the courts have undertaken to
carry out the “public policy” of the state and create a favourable climate
for management. Consciously or unconsciously, ﬁduciary standards . . .
have been relaxed.35
In a compelling rejoinder to Cary’s critique, Ralph Winter argued that
there may be signiﬁcant shareholder value beneﬁt in ﬂexible pro-
managerial rules, and that investors will invest in companies which are
governed by rules that enhance value. It followed that companies which
incorporate in states whose rules undermined value generation are likely
to be disciplined by the market. Accordingly, for Winter, the incorpora-
tion or re-incorporation decision will “favour those states [whose laws]
offer the optimal yield to both shareholders and managers”.36 That is,
rather than a race to the bottom, corporate legal federalism generated
a race to the top, and any decay in the ﬁduciary sealant was likely to have
a positive value beneﬁt.
Winter’s position garnered many followers. Easterbrook and Fischel,
for example, argued that “the managers who pick the state of incorpora-
tion that is most desirable from the perspective of investors will attract
the most money”. For them, this competitive process moulded pro-
shareholder “rules about governance structures but also ﬁduciary
rules”.37 Following Winter’s approach, for Robert Romana, corporate
legal federalism underpinned a value focused “genius” of American
33 William L. Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reﬂections Upon Delaware” (1974) 83
The Yale Law Journal 663, 701.
34 Ibid. at 663. 35 Ibid. at 670.
36 Ralph Winter, “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation”
(1977) 6 The Journal of Legal Studies 251, 275.
37 Frank H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(Harvard University Press: 1991) 5–6.
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corporate law.38 Others have deployed empirical methods to conﬁrm the
value effects of Delaware law.39
Cary and Winter’s work marked the parameters within which the
debate about charter competition has taken place over the past four
decades. Subsequent interventions have provided us with a more
nuanced understanding of the effects of corporate legal federalism, and
of the extent to which it is appropriate to refer to a competition among
states.40 All of these interventions share the view that Delaware law bears
the clear imprint of the competition for charters, although they disagree
on the extent to which this imprint is, and is capable of being, pro-
managerial or pro-shareholder-value, and on exactly who Delaware is
competing with. The most inﬂuential of these interventions have come
from Professors Bebchuk and Roe. In a 1993 article on Federalism and the
Corporation,41 Bebchuk argued that, although the incentives described
by Winter resulted in a race to the top in much of corporate law, in two
areas of law these incentives were likely to break down, resulting in a race
to the bottom. The two areas are the rules which are signiﬁcantly redis-
tributive to managers, and the rules which affect the operation of the
markets which could discipline pro-management incorporation choices.
In relation to areas of law which are signiﬁcantly redistributive, the
argument was that managers had an incentive to choose states that
provided pro-managerial rules, as the gain to managers of those rules
exceeded the costs to them of a negative market reaction (both direct
costs and the probability of removal). Two of the three archetypal areas of
corporate law which Bebchuk identiﬁes as being signiﬁcantly redistribu-
tive are the corporate ﬁduciary rules regulating self-dealing transactions
and those regulating the distribution of corporate opportunities.42
Bebchuk’s position was extremely inﬂuential in carving out an in-
between or “middle-ground” understanding of the effects of corporate
legal federalism, a middle ground where “states pursued suboptimal
38 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (AEI Press: 1993).
39 Robert Daines, “Does Delaware Law Improve FirmValue?” (2001) 62 Journal of Financial
Economics 525.
40 On exactly which states are thought to be competing and with whom, see Robert Daines,
“The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms” (2002) 77 New York University Law Review
1559. See also Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, “The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law” (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 679; and Mark Roe, “Delaware’s
Shrinking Half-Life” (2009) Stanford Law Review 125.
41 Lucian A. Bebchuk, “Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law” (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 1442.
42 Ibid. at 1462. The third area was insider trading.
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policies of management accommodation respecting ﬁduciary rules and
anti-takeover statutes”.43
More recently, Mark Roe has further complicated our understand-
ing of the effect of corporate legal federalism on Delaware lawmaking,
by arguing that lawmaking takes place not only on the state-state
horizontal axis but also on the federal-state vertical axis.44 This
vertical axis requires the Delaware legislature and the Delaware courts
to be responsive to federal politics in order to ensure that no part of
its incorporation franchise is removed by the federal government.
Importantly, although Roe differs in his identiﬁcation of the drivers
of Delaware’s legal evolution, he shares the widely held view that
modern Delaware law is, in large part, the product of the pressures
arising from corporate legal federalism.
Formost contemporary commentators, however, Delaware’s success is
not explained merely by, depending on one’s view, the responsiveness of
its law to the interests of managers or value generation. It is also
explained, more pragmatically, by the wealth of its case law, which offers
considered answers to legal questions and disputes, and by the legal
momentum generated by initial success: having more incorporations
generates more litigation; more litigation enhances the body of precedent
to address companies’ needs; more litigation enhances the legal sophis-
tication and, therefore, the reliability of its judiciary. Roberta Romano
was an early proponent of this view:
Delaware also offers a comprehensive body of care law, which is not
easily replicated by another state, and a handful of experienced judges.
These factors afford ﬁrms greater predictability of the legal outcomes of
their decisions, facilitating planning and reducing the costs of doing
business.45
For Macey andMiller, “probably the greatest beneﬁt that Delaware offers
its corporations is a highly developed case law”.46 More recently,
although arguing that Delaware maintains its lead because of its famil-
iarity to business, Broughman and Ibrahim state that it began “its ascent
to the top of the corporate law hierarchy by offering more desirable law
43 William W. Bratton, “Delaware Law as Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and the
Basic Course after Twenty-Five Years” (2000) 34 Georgia Law Review 447, 450.
44 Mark Roe, “Delaware’s Competition” (2003) 117 Harvard Law Review 588.
45 Roberta Romano, “Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle” (1985) 2
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 225, 280.
46 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, “Toward and Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Law” (1987) 65 Texas Law Review 469, 484.
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than its leading competitor”.47 Relatedly, in understanding Delaware’s
success, Klausner focuses not only on the existing body of law but also on
the effect of positive network externalities associated with the body of
future case law that a high number of incorporations promises.48
The historical account of the evolution of corporate ﬁduciary law in
this book challenges this consensus position about the substantive effects
of corporate legal federalism, and the extent to which Delaware law, the
quality of its judiciary or related network externalities are responsible for
its success. Although this theory is beautifully constructed, the book
shows that, in all its incarnations, it is not supported by the historical
legal record. Consideration of the US and UK law regulating business
judgment, the duty of care, the law of self-dealing and of corporate
opportunities, in Parts I to IV of this book, shows that in each of these
areas the pro-managerial nature of Delaware corporate law cannot be
attributed to any competitive process arising from corporate legal feder-
alism. Nor are the origins of these legal rules found in Delaware law.
The substantive position adopted by Delaware was established in each of
these areas of law outside of Delaware, and before an idea of
a competition for charters had taken hold of the late nineteenth- or
twentieth-century political imagination.49 More striking than this is
that, in each of these areas of the law, Delaware had taken the lead in
the race to attract incorporations50 before it had any law at all. It won
47 See Brian J. Broughman and Darian M. Ibrahim, “Delaware’s Familiarity” (2015) 52 San
Diego Law Review 27, 274.
48 Michael Klausner, “Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Products” (1995) 81
Virginia Law Review 843–844.
49 Typically, the starting point for charter competition is identiﬁed as 1889 when New Jersey
enacted a statute allowing corporations to own stock in other corporations, or as 1896
when New Jersey adopted what is often viewed as the ﬁrst modern corporation code. But
see Charles M. Yablon, “The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and the
Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910” (2007) 32 Journal of Corporation Law 323,
333 (arguing that the process started as early as 1880 although observing that “in the
decade from 1880 to 1889, there was not yet any public recognition that New Jersey, or
any other state, had become a particularly popular state in which to incorporate, although
there is evidence of a different perception among knowledgeable business professionals”).
Arguably West Virginia tried the “charter mongering” strategy ﬁrst in 1888 but to little
avail. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey and the Fiscal Origins of Modern American
Corporation Law (Taylor & Francis: 1993) at 43 (“Before 1890, . . . New Jersey corporate
statutes focused on ﬁrms operating within the state.”); William W. Bratton and Joseph
A. McCahery, “The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism” (2006) 41 Wake
Forest Law Review 619.
50 By 1922 55 per cent of New York Stock Exchange listed companies were incorporated in
Delaware: seeWilliamW. Bratton and Joseph A.McCahery, “The EquilibriumContent of
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without (1) being a ﬁrst mover, (2) without having any, as well as a low
probability of future, legal network externalities associated with a body of
precedent, or (3) the judicial sophistication that arises from creating that
body of precedent. That is, Delaware’s victory had nothing to do with its
laws or its judiciary. Its laws were borrowed wholesale – although typi-
cally without the judicial payment of attribution – from other states,
whose laws in turn were the product of borrowing from other ﬁduciary
and commercial contexts which were deeply indebted to English law.
However, the fact that neither Delaware nor charter competition is the
source of Delaware’s pro-managerial ﬁduciary rules is not to suggest that
corporate legal federalism has had no effect. The book argues, in fact, that
it has had two effects. Delaware succeeded in the competition for corpo-
rate charters, without law and without a sophisticated judiciary, because
of its unusual characteristics. As others have argued,51 as a small, thinly
populated state dependent on the ﬁscal receipts generated by incorpora-
tions, Delaware offered a credible commitment to the legal status quo.
This ﬁscal dependence gave directors incorporating in Delaware the
comfort that it would remain in the risk-range of laws produced else-
where; comfort that larger states that would never be ﬁscally dependent
on franchise taxes could not give. Accordingly, this book’s exploration of
the history of ﬁduciary law shows us that there was no corporate law race
at all, either to the top, to the bottom or to the in-between, merely an
initial imperative to be normal and to replicate existing legal tradition
and then an imperative to defend the status quo. That is, Delaware did
not make its own corporate ﬁduciary laws. Rather, it borrowed them, and
then it fossilised them, shielding them from external accountability
pressures; pressure on the legislature and on the judiciary to reﬂect
modern public and political concerns about the accountability of direc-
tors. In other jurisdictions, which are not exposed to the competition for
charters in the same way or at all, most importantly the United Kingdom
but also other US states, we ﬁnd the imprint of accountability pressures
resulting in legislative intervention, but also common law adjustment.
As we discuss in Chapter 7 on the UK’s duty of care, modern UK
commentators often bemoan the failure of the UK’s common law to
adjust to modern (accountability) conditions. However, the paths of
corporate ﬁduciary law in the UK, when juxtaposed next to Delaware
Corporate Federalism” (2006) 41 Wake Forest Law Review 619, 630 citing Russell
Carpenter Larcom, The Delaware Corporation 11–13 (1937).
51 Romano, supra note 45 at 240–242.
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law, reveal that Delaware law is much more (and comfortably) stuck in
the past than UK law.
The second effect of American corporate legal federalism is a more
pernicious one. The book argues that, having won the competition to
attract the most incorporations, the “idea of being a winner” has created
a Delaware judicial style which detrimentally affects the quality of
Delaware law. The idea of being a winner generates a turn inwards: the
necessity of explainingDelaware’s rules by reference only to the Delaware
statute and the Delaware common law even in the absence of Delaware
authority which could be referred to. It is this style which generates
a resistance to attributing legal principles to their English and (non-
Delaware) American origins, making the task of excavating its legal
origins all the more difﬁcult. But of greater import is that this judicial
style encourages Delaware courts to present and re-present legal ideas
without close attention to prior (non-Delaware) cases that more carefully
unpackage these ideas. This generates the use of borrowed legal ideas in
a way that is disconnected from the rich context in which they were
produced. This Delaware style enhances the probability of entropic legal
re-presentations and mis-representations that disturb the legal order of
things. This approach results, as we see in Part I, in both the production
of ungrounded and empty legal ideas as well as in standard proliferation,
or, as we see in Parts I and II, the production of structural incoherence,
or, as we see in Parts II, III and IV, the combination of very different
(borrowed), in some instances incommensurable, approaches to the
same legal problem – combinations that are, therefore, naturally
unstable. In this way charter competition and the Delaware style breed
indeterminacy.
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